Unconditional concealed questions and Heim's ambiguity by Frana, Ilaria & Rawlins, Kyle
Proceedings of SALT 21: 495–514, 2011
Unconditional concealed questions and Heim’s ambiguity
Ilaria Frana
University of Göttingen
Kyle Rawlins
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract In this paper, we investigate Concealed Questions (CQs) in the context of
headed unconditionals. We observe that although CQs are licensed in unconditionals,
the distribution of readings involved in Heim’s Ambiguity (Heim 1979) does not
match that found in attitude contexts. Furthermore, the distribution of readings varies
by verb class (epistemic vs. communication verbs). We propose that unconditional
concealed questions involve questions derived from the denotation of the DP via a
specially devised type-shifter, and show how this can block the unwanted readings in
exactly the right cases. Heim’s ambiguity, we suggest, is not a unitary phenomenon,
and a hybrid concept/question-based account is necessary to derive the right readings
in the right contexts.
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1 Introduction
Analyses of Concealed Questions (CQs) have been largely tied to the semantics of
attitude ascriptions (Heim 1979; Romero 2005; Frana 2006; Nathan 2006; Schwager
2008; Roelofsen & Aloni 2008; Frana 2010 a.o.). In this paper, we contribute to
disentangling CQs from attitudes by introducing new data involving (non-attitudinal)
headed unconditionals. Some examples are provided in (1–2).
(1) Regardless of the temperature outside, I am going for a run.
) Regardless of what the temperature outside is, ...
(2) Regardless of the computer that Clara buys, she will be able to install LATEX.
) Regardless of what (kind of) computer Clara buys, ...
In the unconditional sentences above, the italicized definite DPs are not used
to pick out a particular entity in the world (a temperature value, or a computer
type). Rather, their meaning is better reflected by an embedded question paraphrase,
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hence the name Concealed Questions (CQs). Beyond simply understanding how the
meaning of a CQ should be derived in unconditionals like (1) and (2), this paper
focuses on a particular type of unconditional CQ, which in attitude context triggers
what is known as Heim’s ambiguity. Heim’s ambiguity has played a central role in
the discussion of CQs in the literature (Heim 1979; Romero 2005; Schwager 2008;
Roelofsen & Aloni 2008; Frana 2010). In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing
debate on which analysis is best suited to cover the empirical domain by discussing
novel data which will shed light on the nature of Heim’s ambiguity and CQs in
general. The central puzzle is what we call the what-value reading gap, where one
of the readings in Heim’s ambiguity is unexpectedly missing in unconditionals.
Heim’s ambiguity can be illustrated by the example in (3). Assume a context
in which the prices of several new Apple products are under discussion. Suppose
further that Miles knows only one of these prices, i.e. he knows the price of the new
iPhone. In this scenario, (3) can mean that both Clara and Miles know how much the
new iPhone costs, i.e. they both know the answer to the same price-question: "What
is the price (value) of the new iPhone?" (Often referred to as an ‘A’ reading, we will
call this the what-value reading). However, (3) has an additional reading according
to which Clara knows the answer to a question about Miles’ knowledge – she can
answer the question "What price (question) does Miles know (the answer to)?" (the
B or in our terms, which-concept reading). In this case, Clara does not need to
know the answer to the price-question “What is the price of the new iPhone?”.
(3) Clara knows the price that Miles knows. (Heim 1979)
What-value/A: Clara knows the same price as Miles, e.g. the price of the
iPhone.
Which-concept/B: Clara knows which price Miles knows.
(4)
the price of the
iPhone is $300
Clara Miles
What value/A reading
the price of
the iPhone is x
Clara
Miles
Which concept/B reading
We will use the term nested CQs to refer to the complex CQs that can lead to
Heim’s ambiguity. The distinctive feature of nested CQs is that the head noun is
modified by a relative clause which contains a CQ-embedding predicate. All the
other CQs, with or without relative clauses, will be referred to as simple CQs.
Nested CQs in unconditionals show an interesting contrast between epistemic
verbs (know, find out, discover, etc.) and verbs of communication (tell, announce,
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etc.).1 As shown in the examples below, nested CQs in unconditionals cannot have
what value readings when the verb (inside the RC) is epistemic (5a). However,
what value readings are available with communication verbs (5b). Which concept
readings, on the other hand, are available with both epistemic and communication
verbs, as shown by (6a) and (6b).
(5) Scenario 1 (single product/what-value): Apple is announcing the price of a single
product tomorrow – the new iPhone. Miles has inside information and knows in
advance what this price is. We are discussing whether to ask Miles about this price.
a. # Regardless of the price that Miles knows, I won’t buy one, so what’s the
point? ) # Regardless of what the price of the new iPhone is, ...
b. Regardless of the price that Miles tells us, I won’t buy one, so what’s
the point? ) Regardless of what the price of the new iPhone is, ...
(6) Scenario 2 (multiple products/which-concept): Apple is announcing the price of
several products tomorrow. Miles has some inside information and knows just one
of these prices, but we don’t know which. We are discussing whether to ask Miles
about his inside information.
a. Regardless of the price that Miles knows, we should still watch to find
out all the rest, so why bother?
) Regardless of which product Miles knows the price of, ...
b. Regardless of the price that Miles tells us, we should still watch.
) Regardless of which product he tells us the price of, ...
The unconditional data above is puzzling for at least two reasons. First, it reveals
a surprising construction asymmetry: the nested CQ (the price that Miles knows)
generates an ambiguity in attitude contexts (3), but not in unconditionals, where
the what-value reading is not available (5a). Second, within unconditionals we find
a puzzling asymmetry with respect to the predicate inside the nested CQ (we will
refer to this as the predicate split): In unconditionals, communication verbs but not
epistemic verbs license what-value readings, as seen by the contrast between (5a)
and (5b). The puzzle is summarized by the table in (7).
(7) The What-value Reading Gap
RC verb context what-value (A) which-concept (B)
epistemic attitude ! !
unconditional # !
communication attitude ! !
unconditional ! !
1 Note that there are verbs of communication (e.g. manner verbs such as mumble/whisper/etc.) that
tend not to have CQ readings; we set these aside.
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In this paper, we provide a fully compositional analysis of simple and nested
CQs in unconditional sentences, which also derives the what-value reading gap. The
paper is structured in the following way: in §2, we discuss the standard approach to
Heim’s ambiguity in attitude contexts, and some background about unconditionals.
Then, we turn to our proposal. We address the contrast between unconditionals
and attitude contexts in two parts, beginning with the what-value reading gap in
unconditionals in §3, and then finally move on to the contrast between epistemic and
communication verbs in unconditional contexts in §4.
2 Background
In the following sections we review some background on the Individual Concept
(IC) account of CQs, as well as the interpretation of unconditionals. In reviewing
the IC account we focus especially on the standard treatment of Heim’s ambiguity
within this approach. We end the section by preparing the way for a question-based
approach to CQs when they appear in unconditionals.
2.1 Concealed Questions and Heim’s ambiguity
The puzzle introduced by the what-value-reading gap becomes even more intriguing
when looking at the treatments of Heim’s ambiguity in the literature. Here we will
review Romero’s (2005) influential analysis. Romero is one of the proponents of the
Individual Concept Approach (IC-approach) to CQs, which was first introduced by
Heim (1979) and later developed by Romero (2005, 2010) and Frana (2010). Heim
(1979) suggests that definite descriptions with CQ-readings, like the underlined DP
in (8), may be analyzed on a par with definite descriptions in temporally intensional
contexts, like the underlined DP in (9).
(8) Clara knows the temperature in this room.
(9) The temperature in this room is rising.
While in (9), the temporally intensional predicate is rising forces us to look at
temperature values at earlier and later (temporal) indices, the epistemic predicate
know in (8) forces us to compare temperature values at different (world) indices
(the actual world w and the worlds according to Clara’s beliefs in w). Given
the Montagovian treatment of sentences like (9) in terms of individual concepts
(Montague 1973), Heim suggests that an analogous analysis could be given for (8).
Roughly speaking, knowing an IC construed as a function from possible worlds to
individuals amounts to the following: if I know the individual concept f in w0, then
f yields the same value at w0 and at the worlds compatible with what I believe in w0.
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Building on Heim 1979, Romero (2005) develops a detailed analysis of DP-CQs
embedded under epistemic know. According to Romero, a parsimonious analysis of
concealed question DPs follows by assuming that predicates like epistemic know
are defined cross-categorially to combine both with questions (10), and individual
concepts (19), (here Doxx(w) stands for the set of worlds compatible with what the
attitude holder x believes in world w, i.e. the set of x’s doxastic alternatives to w). 2
(10) JknowQKw = λQhshstii :λxe :8w0 2 Doxx(w) : [Q(w0) = Q(w)]
(11) JknowicKw = λ fhsei :λxe :8w0 2 Doxx(w) : [ f (w0) = f (w)] Romero (2005)
In the case of simple CQs, knowic combines with the intension of the DP, i.e. an
individual concept derived as shown in (12).3 The sample truth-conditions for a
simple CQ-sentence are given in (13) below.
(12) Jthe price of milk icKw = λw0 : Jthe price of milkKw0 =
λw0 : [ιxe : x is the milk price in w0]
(13) JMiles knowsic the price of milkKw=
8w0 2DoxM(w) : [ιxe :x is the milk price in w0] = [ιxe :x is the milk price in w]
Having seen how simple CQs work in the IC-approach, we can now return to
Heim’s ambiguity in (3). What is special about this example is that the DP-CQ
contains a CQ-embedding predicate, i.e. it is a nested CQ. Because of this, the
complex DP the price that Miles knows ends up denoting an individual concept,
as shown in (14) below. Given that knowic requires an individual concept as its
first argument, the trace ti must be of semantic type hsei. λ abstraction at the CP-
level creates a predicate of individual concepts, which needs to intersect with the
denotation of price. Thus, price must also denote a predicate of individual concepts,
which we are going to derive with Nathan’s IC-shifter, as shown in (15).4 (We will
refer to the denotation in (15) as ‘price-concept’ for simplicity.)
2 At a technical level (10) does not work with the treatment of questions we later adopt, being in the
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984 framework, but it can be straightforwardly adapted so that it does. We
use this entry here for simplicity of presentation.
3 Here, we follow Frana (2010) and assume that such argument is derived by Intensional Functional
Application (c.f. Heim & Kratzer (1998)).
4 Nathan’s IC-shifter ensures that the individual concepts in the extension of price are individuated via
the noun’s internal argument. Each price-concept so derived will be of the form the price of x, i.e. a
function mapping every world in its domain to the price of x at that world (see Nathan 2006; Frana
2010 for discussion on why Nathan’s type shifter is necessary to ascribe correct truth-conditions to
sentences involving quantification over concepts).
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(14) Unpacking nested CQs Romero (2005); Frana (2010)
hsei
the: hhhseitihseii hhseiti
hhseiti
IC-shifter price: hehetii
hhseiti
λ[i;hsei] t
Miles: e heti
knowsic: hhseihetii ti;hsei
= ι fhsei : f is a price-concept ^
8w0 2 DoxM(w@) : f (w0) = f (w@)
(15) JIC(price)Kw= λ fhsei :9xe : 8w0 : f (w0) is the price of x at w0 (Nathan 2006)
Since the nested CQ here already denotes an individual concept, it can combine
with knowic directly, without any further intensionalization, as shown in (16) below.
(16) JClara knowsic the price that Miles knowsicKw= T iff
JknowicKw (Jthe price that Miles knowsicKw)=
8w0 2 DoxC(w) :
 Jthe price that Miles knowsicKw (w0)
= Jthe price that Miles knowsicKw (w)

In our context, the unique price-concept whose value is known to Miles is the
individual concept that maps every world to the price of the new iPhone in that world.
Let’s call this concept iPHONE-PRICE. Given this context, the above formula is
equivalent to (17), i.e. a what-value reading:
(17) 8w0 2 DoxC(w) : [iPHONE-PRICE(w0) = iPHONE-PRICE(w)]
Romero’s analysis reflects the intuition that the what-value reading is in some
sense analogous to simple CQ-readings. In both cases, we are comparing the value
of an individual concept across possible worlds (the actual world and the attitude
holder’s belief worlds); the difference lies in the way this individual concept comes
about. In the case of simple CQs, the IC argument is provided by taking the intension
of an individual denoting DP; whereas in the case of nested CQ, the DP itself already
denotes an individual concept, which can be fed to knowic directly.
For the which-concept reading, Romero spells out a proposal originally sketched
by Heim (1979). The main idea is that in which-concept readings, we are comparing
the values of a more complex concept, namely the function that maps every possible
world w to the concept whose value Miles knows in w. This higher order concept
is derived by taking the intension of (14), as shown in (18).
(18)
q
the price that M. knows hshseii
yw = λw : Jthe price that M. knowsKw =
λw : [ι fhsei : f is a price-concept ^8w00 2 DoxM(w) : f (w00) = f (w)]
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However, this function cannot be fed to knowic. In order to accomodate higher-
order concepts, Romero ends up advocating for a cross-categorial denotation for
CQ-embedding know, given in (19) below.
(19) JknowCQKw = λ fhτi :λxe :8w0 2 Doxx(w) : [ f (w0) = f (w)]
where τ = hsei or hshseii or... (Romero 2005)
The right truth-conditions for the which-concept reading are derived by assuming
that the matrix know selects for a concept of type hshseii, while the lower know
inside the RC selects for a simple individual concept.
(20) JknowCQKw (λw Jthe price that Miles knowsCQKw) =
8w0 2 DoxC(w) :
 Jthe price that Miles knowsCQKw0
= Jthe price that Miles knowsCQKw

With ‘iPHONE-PRICE’ again referring to the unique price-concept whose value
is known to Miles at the evaluation world w, the formula above reduces to (21):
(21) 8w0 2 DoxC(w) :
[ι fhsei : f is a price-concept and 8w00 2 DoxM(w0) : f (w00) = f (w0)]
= iPHONE-PRICE

According to the formula above, (3) is true iff the unique price concept whose
value Miles knows in Clara’s belief worlds is the concept he actually knows, i.e. the
price of the iPhone. These T-conditions correctly capture the which-concept reading.
In light of the Individual Concept analysis of Heim’s ambiguity, the what-value
reading gap discussed in §1 becomes even more mysterious. On the one hand,
there is the surprising fact that simple CQs are licensed in unconditionals, even
though nested CQs (with epistemic predicates) cannot have a what-value reading.
This fact breaks the parallelism built into Romero’s account between simple CQs
and what-value readings. On the other hand, it is surprising that the supposedly
simpler what-value reading is absent in unconditionals, while the more complex
which-concept reading is present. In Romero’s account the two readings are quite
intertwined and it is hard to see how one could block the what-value reading, while
allowing for the which-concept reading.
2.2 Unconditionals
We adopt here Rawlins’ (2008) analysis of unconditionals. The basic idea is that
an unconditional involves quantifying over a set of exhaustive alternatives provided
compositionally by the adjunct; each alternative provides a domain restriction for
a main-clause operator, illustrated pictorially in (22) and more formally in (23).
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In English, the alternative set is present because the adjunct (α below) is question
denoting (and, Rawlins argues, has interrogative syntax). Unconditionals contrast
with the case of an if -conditional in this framework (Lewis 1975; Kratzer 1981
etc.), which are not question-denoting and provide a single, non-exhaustive domain
restriction. The compositional details of Rawlins’ analysis beyond (23) will not be
necessary for present purposes.5
(22) No matter what disease Miles has, he should stay home from school.
8>><
>>:
Miles has the flu,
Miles has a cold,
Miles has the measles,
: : :
9>>=
>>;
should
M. stay home
restricts
βOp[Q α]
(23) JNo matter [Q α], Op [β ]Kw = 8p 2 J[Q α]Kw : JOpKw (p)(Jβ Kw)
An example like (22) can be paraphrased as: for every salient disease that Miles
might have, if he has that disease, he should stay home from school. (E.g. in all
deontically/bouletically ideal worlds where he has that disease, he stays home.) An
alternative paraphrase involves a sequence of if -conditionals: if he has the flu, he
should stay home from school, and if he has a cold, he should stay home, etc.
Before expanding this idea to CQs, it is helpful to briefly consider the selection
restrictions of headed unconditionals. The generalization is that they take interrog-
ative clauses of all types, as well as just those DPs that have a CQ interpretation.6
(The generalization is the same for no matter and regardless of adjuncts.)
(24) ! {No matter / Regardless of} who goes to the party, it will be fun.
wh-interrogative !
(25) ! No matter whether Miles goes to the party, it will be fun.
whether-interrogative !
(26) ! No matter the location of the party, it will be fun. CQ DP !
(27) # No matter Miles, the party will be fun. Proper name #
(28) # No matter that Miles is going, the party will be fun. that-clause #
5 One important point we will abstract away from is that the propositional alternatives quantified over
in this construction are subject to domain restriction and we don’t actually quantify over every single
possible answer to the adjunct question; see Rawlins 2008.
6 There is a related but idiomatic construction in English in which a no matter clause takes that-clauses
and acts sententially (does not adjoin). see Rawlins (2008) §2.1.7 for discussion.
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This data provides a piece of evidence that has been mostly lacking in the
concealed question literature (see e.g. Nathan 2006; Percus 2010 for a discussion
of this point): an environment where CQs pattern with questions, and nothing
else. These selectional facts can be taken as evidence that concealed questions in
unconditionals should be treated as questions, semantically. Additionally, Rawlins’
analysis leads us to expect that the content of a headed unconditional is alternative-
denoting, again pressuring an analysis of unconditional CQs towards a question
denotation in at least this case. On the basis of the aforementioned evidence, i.e. (i)
selectional facts, (ii) compatibility with existing analysis of unconditionals (Rawlins
2008) and (iii) the asymmetry between epistemic verbs and unconditional adverbs
(the what-value reading gap), we conclude that unconditional CQs do not denote
individual concepts. Rather, we propose an account where unconditional CQs are
question-denoting, and receive an analysis where they introduce Hamblin alternatives
(or an analog) into semantic composition. Notice though that although we argue for a
question-based analysis of unconditional CQs, we do not advocate that such approach
must be extended to CQs in general, or that the individual concept approach should
be abandoned. Rather, we will develop a hybrid account where both individual
concept and question denotations are employed for CQs in different environments.
The idea that CQs are questions is not new. Early approaches took a syntac-
tic/transformational view of this idea (Baker 1968), but this approach is widely
agreed to be non-viable and we will not review the arguments against the syntactic
treatment (see Grimshaw 1979; Nathan 2006; Frana 2010 a.o.). The consensus is
that if CQs are questions, it is at the level of semantic representation. Question-based
approaches have seen a recent revival (Aloni 2008; Aloni & Roelofsen 2009; Percus
2010); these approaches involve substantially different analyses and we will save
a full comparison to our hybrid account for a later date. The common thread is
that definite descriptions can be type-shifted into e.g. sets of propositions (question
denotations in the Hamblin framework) in order to save composition.
3 Unconditional CQs
3.1 The Qeq-shifter and simple unconditional CQs
The technical puzzle then is how definite descriptions can be treated as question-
denoting in the context of unconditionals. Of the prior approaches we most closely
follow Aloni (2008) (see also Roelofsen & Aloni (2008)) in that the type-shifter
takes an individual-denoting expression, and builds a copular question out of it. Our
proposal is given in (29):
(29)
q
Qeq(α)
yw= λ phsti :9y 2 Dτ : p = (λw0 : y = JαKw0)
(Where τ is e or some intension of e)
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This type-shifter is novel in producing only equative questions. A question of
this form asks what thing does α equal? where the two entities being equated must
have the same semantic type τ . In other words, the shifter forces us to compare
either an individual (at an index) to another individual, or a concept (at an index)
to another concept. (In particular, it will never produce specificational questions in
the sense of Romero (2005); A specificational question in this sense is one where an
object of type hsei is compared to an object of type hei, by saturation of the world
argument. This will become important when dealing with Heim’s ambiguity, as it
will block what-value/A readings).7
We begin exemplifying the shifter with basic cases such as (31) (repeated from
(2)) or (30), unconditionals with simple CQs.
(30) Regardless of the price of that iMac, you should buy it.
(31) Regardless of the computer that Clara buys, she can install LATEX.
The DPs in question denote individuals, though their value is index-dependent,
so they instantiate the case of the shifter in (29) where τ = e. The questions will
therefore ask about the identity of an object.
A simple CQ with a relational noun (RN) such as the one in (30) works straight-
forwardly. The RN is saturated by its internal argument, and combines with the
definite article as a simple property; the result is illustrated in (32).
(32) Jthe price of that iMacKw= ιxe : x is the price-value of that iMac in w
(33)
q
Qeq(the price of that iMac)
yw=
λ phsti :9y2De : p = (λw0 :y = (ιxe :x is the price-value of that iMac in w0))
The shifter then takes the individual-denoting expression in (32) and generates the
set of alternative propositions characterized by (33), each proposition corresponding
to a different possible price-value. These alternatives will have a form like, e.g. the
price of the iMac is $1000, the price of the iMac is $800, etc. This alternative set
plugs directly into the scheme for unconditional interpretation in (23), generating
the truth-conditions in (34) (with w as the world of evalution):
(34) 8p 2 fp j 9y 2 De : p = (λw0 : y = (ιxe : x is the price of that iMac in w0))g :
shouldw(p)(λw0 :you buy it in w0)
7 A similar type shifter is also given in Nathan 2006 who, while not advocating a question approach,
gives a type-shifter that overcomes many of the prior arguments against question approaches (see
Nathan 2006 §2.1, and ex. 6). This shifter takes an individual concept, and generates a set of
alternatives. However, Nathan’s question shifter overgenerates with our data since it generates only
specificational questions.
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For every alternative proposition describing the price of that iMac, in all accessible
worlds where that proposition is true, I buy that iMac in that world.
The relative clause example in (2) works similarly; the derivation involves build-
ing a type e denotation by the standard intersective analysis of restrictive relatives
(e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998). The description uniquely identifies (at an index) some-
thing that is a computer and that Clara buys it, and the Qeq-shifter builds sets of
propositions around this description. For example, if a;b are particular computers in
the domain (or computer-kinds), then the alternatives would be e.g. the computer
that C. buys is a, the computer that C. buys is b, etc. Again, this alternative set plugs
straightforwardly into the unconditional schema, as shown in (36), interpreting (31)
(w here is the evaluation world for the sentence).
(35)
q
Qeq(the computer [λi that Clara buys ti])
yw=
λ phsti :9y 2 De : p =

λw0 : y =

ιxe :

x is a computer in w
^Clara buys x in w

(36) 8p 2 J(35)Kw : canw(p)(λw0 :C. installs LaTeX on it in w0)
This account for simple definites makes a further prediction (see also Nathan
2006: §2 fn. 2 for the corresponding prediction of his type-shifter). Rigid definites
should be infelicitous in unconditionals: when applied to a rigid definite the Qeq-
shifter generates a singleton set containing just a tautological proposition (which
reduces to fλw0 : Miles 2 Deg), not a valid question meaning. The only type e
descriptions that are predicted to be licensed are those that are index-dependent.
(37) # No matter Miles, the party will be fun.q
Qeq(Miles)
yw = λ phsti :9y 2 De : p = (λw0 : y = Miles)
With simple CQs and other definites out of the way, we turn to the more complex
case of nested CQs, where the type-shifter involves higher-typed arguments.
3.2 Nested CQs and the what-value reading gap
On the IC account, the extension of a nested CQ at a given world is an individual
concept (hsei), not an individual. The result is that our proposed type-shifter behaves
differently than in the simple CQ case, building an equative question about concepts,
and generating a which-concept reading only. This can be seen in (38), which is the
result of applying the Qeq-shifter to the nested DP-CQ the price that Miles knows
(the details are from the earlier tree in (14)).
(38)
q
Qeq(the price that Miles knows)
yw
= λ phsti :9y 2 Dhsei : p = (λw0 : y = (ι fhsei : f is a price-concept ^
8w00 2 DoxM(w0) : f (w00) = f (w0)))
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The alternatives generated in (38) characterize price concepts that Miles can
correctly determine the value of (i.e. propositions of the form the price that M.
knows is the price of milk, the price that M. knows is the price of cookies, etc).
When combined with the unconditional schema, we get quantification over such
alternatives:
(39) JNo matter Q(the price that Miles knows), we should still watch.Kw@=
8p0 2
(
p
 9yhsei : p = (λw
0
: y = [ι fhsei : f is a price-concept ^
8w00 2 DoxM(w0) : f (w00) = f (w0)])
)
:
shouldw@(p
0)(λw0 :we still watch w0)
Simple CQs and nested CQs thus come apart as a result of their compositional
structure, with unconditional which-concept CQs quantifying over alternatives iden-
tifying concepts, not values. In (40) we have summarized both the simple RC case
from (35) and the nested RC which-concept reading, pictorially. Each line in the
curly braces is a propositional alternative, corresponding to a possible answer to the
question generated by the type-shifted DP in question.
(40)
λw : the computer = in w,
λw : the computer = in w,
λw : the computer = in w
can( )(λw0 : she installs LATEX in w0)p
restricts
Qeq-shifter case 1:
τ = e,
α = “the computer that Clara buys”
the price
of ?λw : = iPhone-price in w
the price
of ?λw : = nano-price in w
the price
of ?λw : = ipad-price in w
should( )(λw0 : we still watch in w0)p
restricts
Qeq-shifter case 2:
τ = hsei,
α = “the price that Miles knows”
Before turning to verbs of communication in §4, we must briefly address the
issue of what-value readings in attitude contexts. These cannot be generated by
shifting a DP into a question, in our system. The solution lies in the hybridization
of our account with Romero’s. We have not eliminated individual concepts or
Romero’s knowic and the account of Heim’s ambiguity in attitude contexts is the one
already described in §2.1. To sum up, the major divide between the two types of
environments – attitude vs. unconditionals – lies in the availability of a predicate
selecting for individual concepts; in the case of unconditionals, there is no such
predicate, and we see a ‘pure’ concealed question.
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4 Accounting for Predicate Split
We now return to the contrast between epistemic predicates and communication
verbs summarized in (7) – the question of why what-value readings do appear with
communication verbs in unconditionals. We argue that the ambiguity displayed by
unconditional CQs with communication verbs, illustrated by (6b) and (5b) is not the
same type of ambiguity displayed by nested CQs in attitude contexts, but rather it is
due to the fact that verbs of communication have an extra direct mention reading.
This entry is in a certain sense extensional – it takes a referential argument; in our
proposed analysis of unconditional CQs, this predicts a what-value reading derived in
the same way as a simple CQ-RC. We proceed by first presenting some background
on verba dicendi, then give evidence for the direct mention entry, and finally show
the consequences for unconditional CQs and the existence of a what-value reading.
4.1 A (simplified) semantics for Verba Dicendi
Attitude verbs in general typically select for a range of arguments, and the standard
approach is to treat the verbs as having a series of minimally different lexical entries
(or one cross-categorial entry) to allow for different types of arguments.8 Thus,
similarly to the standard treatment of epistemic know, as a baseline one would expect
tell to have a proposition-selecting entry (tellthat), a question-selecting entry (tellQ)
and an individual concept selecting entry to allow for CQ-readings (tellic).
(41) a. Miles told me that the iPhone costs 400USD. tellthat
b. Miles told me what the iPhone costs. tellQ
c. Miles told me the price of the new iPhone. tellic
We begin with the standard assumption that verba dicendi have the same lexical
structure as attitude predicates in general, involving quantification over some set of
accessible worlds. The work of giving an account therefore involves understanding
precisely which worlds to quantify over (see Davidson 1968; Ogihara 1995; Cappelen
& Lepore 1997; Kemp 2001 among many others). Roughly, we will assume someone
tells someone else that p just in case there is a speech event in which its agent utters
something that has a denotation corresponding to p. There are many ways that the
details could be spelled out, but for concreteness we will assume the entry in (42).
To see how this works, consider how this verb might be used in the context in (43).
(42) JtellthatKw = λxe :λ pst :λye :λe :9α : e is an event of y uttering α to x at w
^8w0 2 JαKw0 ! p(w0)
8 In the long run, we would hope for a theory of how these entries are related, i.e. an account of the
regularities of the polysemy, but we will not provide one in this paper.
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(43) a. Context: Miles and Clara are having a conversation about the new iPhone,
during which Miles tells her what the iPhone costs. Later on Clara reports
what she has learnt from Miles by saying (41a).
b. Miles: The new iPhone just came out, it costs only 400USD. I am going
to buy it tomorrow [...]
Given the lexical entry for tellthat , in (42), we (correctly) expect (41a) above to
be true in the given scenario; this is because there is an utterance α in the given
context that verifies our truth-conditions, namely the underlined sentence in (43b).
The truth-conditions for the full sentence are shown in (44) below (here we are
following standard assumptions regarding the interpretation of tense and aspect).9
(44) JM. told that C. that the iPhone costs 400USDKw = T iff
9e :9α : time(e) < t0 ^ e is an event of Miles uttering α to Clara at w
^8w0 2 JαKw0 ! the iPhone costs 400USD at (w0)
So far, this is roughly the standard case of indirect speech. However, there are
other ways in which Clara could have reported the speech event described in (43)
that have not received attention in this literature. For example, Clara could have also
felicitously uttered (41c), where a DP-CQ occurs as argument of tell. To account for
concealed questions in reported speech, we would need to introduce a lexical entry
for tell that selects for individual concepts, modeled after Romero’s entry for knowic.
A concrete proposal is given in (45) below, with truth-conditions for (41c) in (46).
(45) JtellicKw = λxe :λ fhsei :λye :λe :9α : e is an event of y uttering α to x at w
^8w0 2 JαKw0 ! [ f (w0) = f (w)]
(46) JM. told IC C. the price of the iPhoneKw = 1 iff
9e :9α : time(e) < t0 ^ e is an event of Miles uttering α to Clara at w
^8w0 2 JαKw0 ! (iPHONE-PRICE(w0) = iPHONE-PRICE(w))
Assuming that α is resolved in favor of the underlined sentence in (43b) and
that Miles was speaking the truth, then it would also be true that all the worlds
compatible with the proposition expressed by “the iPhone costs only 400USD” are
worlds in which the iPhone’s price is the same as in the actual world.10
An entry along these lines appears necessary in order to account for straightfor-
ward CQs used to report speech. However, if verba dicendi had exactly the same
types of entries as epistemic predicates, we expect no contrast between the two types
of predicates with respect to CQ-readings on the account we have developed. More
9 The addition of an event argument here represents that tell is eventive, but know is stative.
10 Thus, our analysis correctly predicts that tellIC is factive whereas tellthat is not.
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specifically, what-value readings would be blocked by the same machinery employed
for nested CQs with epistemic predicates. We propose that the Predicate Split is
explained by a distinction in available entries between communication verbs (as a
class) and epistemic verbs. For tell we will call this entry tellDM (‘Direct Mention’).
In the following section, we begin by providing independent motivation for this
entry, demonstrating that none of the entries parallel to a verb like know are adequate
to handle a range of data where a DP argument acts ‘extensional’. Once the right
entry is admitted on independent grounds, we show that the what-value readings
simply follow from the way the direct-mention entry has to work.11
4.2 Adjusted reports and the transparency effect
Consider the report in (48) in the context given in (47).
(47) Context: Miles asks Clara what her ATM password is. Clara responds,
“My PIN is 01060”. In fact, her actual password is 01170, while 01060 is
Northampton’s zip code.
(48) Clara told Miles Northampton’s zip code instead of her PIN.
Although the report in (48) looks like a regular CQ-sentence, there is something
peculiar about it: the description used in it (Northampton’s zip code) does not
supply the (concealed) question that was addressed in the speech event. That is,
the description in the report is used transparently. Clara did not actually answer
a question about the identity of Northampton’s zip code, but rather attempted (and
failed) to provide an answer to a different question, about her PIN. Nonetheless, the
speaker can truthfully utter (48) in this context.
Applying the IC-taking entry for tell to (48) would not work here. In fact,
assuming that α is the sentence uttered by Clara in response to Miles’ question
(My PIN is 01060), the truth-conditions in (49) below would predict the sentence
to be true iff all the worlds in which Clara’s PIN is 01060 are worlds in which
Northampton’s zip code is Northampton’s actual zip code (i.e. 01060). But this is
not at all the meaning of the sentence. Moreover, since there could be plenty of
11 A second piece of evidence that we do not have space to fully discuss here is the interpretation of Wh
questions headed by a relational noun. With verba dicendi, what+relational noun can be used to ask
about a value, but with epistemic verbs, it can’t. A question like (i) can be answered with a value
(e.g. $3.22), but not (ii). (ii) would have to be answered by identifying the (concealed) question being
resolved in some way – e.g. the iPhone’s price, or what the price of the iPhone is. ((i) can also be
answered in this way.) The behavior thus exactly parallels the split seen with unconditional CQs.
(i) What price did Miles tell you? (ii) What price does Miles know?
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worlds in which Clara’s PIN is 01060, while Northampton’s zip code is some other
number, the sentence would also be false, contrary to intuitions.
(49) JC. told IC M. Noho’s zipcodeKw = 1 iff
9e :9α : time(e) < t0 ^ e is an event of Carla uttering α to Miles at w
^8w0 2 JαKw0 ! [NOHO zip code (w0) = NOHO zip code (w)]
Cases with epistemic verbs work differently. Suppose that someone takes Clara
to be genuinely mistaken and that she has no idea of what Northampton’s zip code
might be. In this case, her state of mind cannot be reported with (50).
(50) Clara knows Northampton’s zip code (instead of her PIN.)
That is, a description cannot be used transparently with an epistemic verb, but can
with a verb of communication.
4.3 TellDM and tellIC
We have seen that tell can be used with a DP argument that admits a transpar-
ent/extensional reading and that such uses can not be accounted for by a standard IC-
taking entry along the lines of knowIC. The entry we propose to handle transparency
is given in (51).12 Crucially, the speech argument s (the argument corresponding to
the description) is used referentially, unlike in an IC-taking entry.
(51) JtelldmKw= λxe :λ se :λye :λe :9α : e is an event of y uttering α to x at w
^8w0 : JαKw0 ! (s = f(w0))
Where f 2 Dhsei is salient in the utterance context of α .
According to the entry above, a speech argument of type e is a suitable argument
for tell, as long as it provides an answer(/value) for a salient CQ (/concept).13 This
requirement is intended to explain the contrast between examples like (52) and (53).
When (52) is uttered out of the blue, the sentence feels marginal. However, it im-
proves considerably when the context of the report makes a certain concept(/question)
salient to the speech event, as in (53).
(52) # John told me 400USD.
(53) When I asked Miles for the price of the iPhone, he told me 400USD.
12 As before, the account of how polysemy in these predicates is regular is deferred for another day.
For instance, one would like an explanation of why epistemic predicates don’t have these entries, but
verba dicendi do.
13 We leave open exactly how the value for f is supplied, though we suspect that it derives from a
Question Under Discussion (QUD) salient in the context of the report (Roberts 1996).
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With the DM-entry above, we can account for the transparency effect data in
(48). In this example, Clara used the (actual) referent of the DP Northampton’s zip
code in order to try to resolve a (C)Q salient in that context (and recoverable from
the report); in this case we know that she was just asked what her ATM password
is, leading e.g. JClara’s ATM PasswordK to be the salient concept. The proposed
additional entry therefore explains the transparency effect, as shown in (54).
(54) JClara told DM Miles NOHO-zip codeKw = 1 iff
9e :9α : time(e) < t0 ^ e is an event of Clara uttering α to Miles at w^
8w0 2 JαKw0 ! [ιx :NOHO-zip-code(x)(w) = ιx :Clara-PIN(x)(w0)]
(Where f is resolved as λw : ιx : Clara-PIN(x)(w))
The data on transparency effect provides evidence in favor of the DM-entry for
tell, but it does not provide evidence for an independent tellIC entry. If the concept
picked out by f is the one provided by the speech argument DP, the two entries yield
equivalent results for simple CQs. However, we would still need tellIC to account
for B/which-concept readings in Heim’s ambiguity in examples such as (55).
(55) Clara told me the price that Miles told you.
We leave a full account of the relationship of these entries, and how they might be
collapsed, for the future. For now we assume that the derivation of a which-concept
reading with verba dicendi remains parallel to the derivation for epistemic verbs.
4.4 What-value readings with verba dicendi are DM-readings
Given this independently needed entry for tell, we are now in a position to return to
what-value readings. The proposal is that what-value readings with verba dicendi
are direct mention readings, as illustrated in (the simplified) (56). Their distribution
follows from the class of embedded verb, i.e. whether that embedded verb has a
direct-mention entry. Type-wise, the derivation of these readings behaves exactly
like relative clause examples such as the case in (35). They involve the lower-
typed instantiation of the Qeq-shifter, leading to quantification over propositions
equating individuals x with price-values that Miles identifies in answer to some
salient price-concept f. In the scenario described in (6), the most salient concept is
iPHONE-PRICE (introduced in §2.1), and so the alternatives would be propositions
like “the price-value that Miles told us (as the value of iPHONE-PRICE) is $300/,
$400, etc.”.
(56)
q
Qeq(the price [λi that Miles tellsDM us ti])
yw=
λ phsti :9y 2 De : p =

λw0 : y =

ιxe :

x is a price-value in w
^M. tellsDM us x as f in w

(where f is a concept salient in Miles’ utterance context)
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On the other hand, epistemic know lacks an extensional entry, and consequently,
the what-value reading is expected to be absent in unconditionals.14
The proposal then is that the split in behavior of unconditionals follows from
a general split in behavior of communication and epistemic verbs, where the two
pattern differently in extensional contexts. In consequence, what-value/A readings
are possible with verba dicendi in unconditionals because these verbs have an
extensional entry, generating the meaning of a simple CQ.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have broadened the traditional scope of the investigation of con-
cealed questions to include CQs in unconditionals. Our proposal is that in uncon-
ditionals, we see ‘pure’ CQs, necessarily derived via a type-shifter that converts
individuals or individual concepts into equative questions. Crucially, CQs built this
way cannot involve specificational readings in the sense of Romero (2005). The
data and proposal reveals new insights into the nature of Heim’s ambiguity: the
ambiguity is heterogeneous with respect to verb class and derivation. In uncondi-
tional contexts, we have proposed that the presence or absence of a What-value/A
reading follows from the properties of the predicates involved; verba dicendi have
(independently necessary) readings that act extensional, and result in a what-value
reading, but epistemic predicates do not have these readings. In attitudinal contexts,
this distinction is masked by the ability of the selecting attitude predicate to interact
directly with an individual concept.
We draw two major conclusions from this work. First, more fine-grained ty-
pologies of attitude predicates beyond epistemics are necessary for understanding
the properties concealed questions; much future work remains to understand the
nature and scope of the verb classes we have been exploring here. Second, concealed
questions are not necessarily a unitary phenomenon: a hybrid individual concept
/ question-based approach to CQs is necessary, and may help resolve the tension
between competing IC and question approaches in the recent literature.
14 Of course, know does have a semi-related extensional entry, for the so-called acquaintance reading,
and we would therefore predict acquaintance unconditionals to be possible with embedded know.
This is exactly right, illustrated by the most natural interpretation of (i):
(i) Regardless of the Italian city that Clara knows (best), Miles is going to Venice for his
vacation.
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